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Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximise some
continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare.
Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called “conti-
nuity for easy cases” while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a
widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected
utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is “no”: given tran-
sitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates
the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker
continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition.
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1 Introduction
The continuity axiom of expected utility theory entails that no outcome is so
bad that one should be unwilling to risk it for the sake of a high enough chance
of a marginal improvement on the status quo. More precisely, the axiom states
that for any triple of outcomes, A, B, and C, such that A is preferred to B which
is preferred to C, there is some probability p such that a rational decision-maker
is indifferent between on the one hand getting B for sure and on the other hand
a lottery (or gamble) that with probability p results in A but otherwise (with
probability 1-p) results in C.
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sala, Sweden. Email: orri.stefansson@philosohy.su.se. URL: www.orristefansson.is.
1
Many people seem to have the intuition that continuity cannot hold in full
generality. For instance, what if B is some outcome where you enjoy a high
level of lifetime well-being and A is only marginally better than B, while C is
an outcome that involves your death? (Luce and Raiffa 1967: 27) Or, to take
another example, what if A, B, and C denote lifetime income, where B is some
very high income and A is income B plus an added dollar each year, whereas
C is a lifetime income of $0 per year? (Temkin 2001)
Those who hold what I shall call the anti-continuity judgement typically
take some examples like these to undermine continuity. The aim of this note is
to explore whether continuity can be weakened, to satisfy the anti-continuity
judgement, while still assuming that the decision-maker of interest wants (un-
der certainty) to maximise some continuous value. So, an example of the type
of decision-maker that I shall be concerned with is one whose aim is to max-
imise their lifetime income. Another example is a social planner whose aim is
to maximise some continuous measure of “social welfare”.
That the above two decision-makers want to maximise some continuous
value (income or continuous social welfare) as far as risk-free outcomes are
concerned, does not imply that they must satisfy the continuity axiom when
evaluating lotteries. More generally, an outcome axiology that maximises some
continuous value is consistent with a lottery axiology that violates the continuity
axiom of expected utility theory.
My inquiry is inspired by the discussion of Temkin (2001), Arrhenius and
Rabinowicz (2005), and Jensen (2012). They explore weakening continuity,
as I do below, and find that, given some additional assumptions, the full-
blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory follows. However, these
authors assume what is essentially the independence axiom of expected utility
theory,1 which I think we have independent reason to reject (as I have argued
in Stefánsson and Bradley 2015). Hence, I shall not assume independence.
However, I show that essentially the same result can be obtained by re-
placing independence by some weak trade-off assumptions, which seem hard
to deny given that the decision-maker of interest wants to maximise some
1Informally, independence states that when comparing two risky prospects, one can ignore
outcomes on which the two prospects confer the same probability. Strictly speaking, the above-
mentioned authors do not assume independence, but a condition that entails independence
assuming that the preference relation is a weak order.
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continuous value as far as risk-free outcomes are concerned. I end the note
by examining even weaker continuity conditions than the above-mentioned
authors consider, and find that these conditions are consistent with the anti-
continuity judgement.
2 The case against continuity
Let O be a set of outcomes, and let [A, p,C] be a “lottery” that with probability
p results in A and with probability 1 − p results in C. ≺ denotes the strict
preference relation, ∼ the indifference relation (and later I’ll use - for the weak
preference relation). [0, 1] denotes the closed interval between (and including)
0 and 1; (0, 1) the corresponding open interval (which neither contains 0 nor 1
but does contain every number in between 0 and 1). The version of continuity
with which I will be primarily concerned—which is entailed by expected utility
theory—can now be stated as:
Axiom (Continuity). For any A,B,C ∈ O such that C ≺ B ≺ A, there is a p ∈ (0, 1)
such that:
B ∼ [A, p,C]
In addition to the two personal catastrophes discussed in the introduction,
some examples involving social catastrophes might seem to undermine conti-
nuity. An example of a social catastrophe is an existential catastrophe, which
we can define as an outcome that brings about “the premature extinction of
Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its
potential for desirable future development” (Bostrom 2013: 15). Next consider:
Example. Supposes that C is an existential catastrophe while B is some fantastic
social outcome, and let A be some social outcome that is only marginally better than B
(perhaps B plus one person living an additional minute of happy life). Would a rational
social planner necessarily be willing to give up B for a (non-trivial, that is, p strictly
between zero and one) lottery between A and C?
“No”, someone who worries about existential risk might say2—which
2For instance, Bostrom’s maxipok rule, which instructs us to maximise the probability avoid-
ing existential catastrophe (Bostrom 2013: 19), violates continuity when existential risk is con-
cerned. Applied to the above example, maxipok selects B over any non-trival lottery between
C and A, since any such lottery reduces the probability of avoiding existential catastrophe.
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would then be another instance of what I called the “anti-continuity judge-
ment”. More generally, the judgement is that some outcome C is so catastrophic
that, for some outcomes A and B, where A is better than B which is better than
C, one would never be indifferent between B and a non-trivial lottery between
A and C. More formally:
Anti-continuity judgement. For some A,B,C ∈ O such that C ≺ B ≺ A, there is
no p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
B ∼ [A, p,C]
In response to the anti-continuity judgement, it could be pointed out that
we constantly take risks that increase the chance of a catastrophe. For instance,
realising that we dropped a £5 bill before crossing the street, we might go back
to pick it up (A), which at best results in an outcome that is marginally better
than our life without the £5 (B), but also yields some chance p that we will be
killed by a car while crossing the street (C).
However, the fact that we do take such risks does not mean that it would
never be rationally permissible for a decision-maker to violate continuity (Arrhe-
nius and Rabinowicz 2005).3 The aim for the reminder of this paper is to explore
the idea that the anti-continuity judgement is rationally permissible4—that is, to
examine whether violating continuity can be rationally permissible—by seeing
whether it can be sustained when combined with assumptions and principles
that even those who hold the anti-continuity judgement should accept.
3 Weakening continuity
The problem with continuity—if there is a problem—might be that it is meant
to hold for any A,B,C such that C ≺ B ≺ A, no matter how much worse C is
than B compared to how much (or little) worse B is than A. As a first attempt,
we can weaken continuity in light of this potential problem. Start by ranking
the outcomes in O and label them accordingly, from the worst outcome, O1,
to the best, On. (Two equally good outcomes are treated as one and the same
3Moreover, it is, of course, possible that the potential catastrophe doesn’t even occur to
people when engaging in this type of behaviour.
4Note that the anti-continuity judgement itself is not about rationality; it is simply a claim
about preference between outcomes and lotteries that might be true of some agents but not
others. I thank a referee for making me see the need to clarify this.
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outcome.)5 I shall assume that for each decision-maker we consider, O1 is
catastrophic while On is very good.
Now consider the following weakening of continuity, which Arrhenius and
Rabinowicz (2005) call continuity for adjacent elements, and which by itself is
consistent with the anti-continuity judgement:
Axiom (Continuity for adjacent elements). For any triple Oi−1,Oi,Oi+1 ∈ O there
is a p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Oi ∼ [Oi+1, p,Oi−1]
Continuity for adjacent elements is similar to Temkin’s (2001) “continuity
for easy cases”, although Temkin states his principle in terms of some stipu-
lated quantitative measure of how good/bad are the outcomes. Arrhenius and
Rabinowicz (2005) and Jensen (2012) show that given independence and transi-
tivity,6 continuity for adjacent elements implies continuity. But, as previously
mentioned, I don’t want to assume independence.
However, by assuming a weak trade-off principle and transitivity of indif-
ference (see fn. 6), continuity for adjacent elements violates the anti-continuity
judgement. Consider:
Assumption 1 (Downward trade-off). For any triple Oi−1,Oi,Oi+1 ∈ O and for
any p ∈ (0, 1), there is a q ∈ (0, 1) such that:
[Oi+1, p,Oi] ∼ [Oi+1, q,Oi−1]
Downward trade-off could be viewed as a structural constraint on the set
of outcomes (to adapt Suppes 2002 terminology), not a rationality constraint on
preference. But it is hard to see how a decision-maker of the type that interests
us here could deny it. Whether the decision-maker is interested in maximising
5Although I will be working with a set of outcomes that corresponds to finitely many value
levels—in other words, I am assuming that there is a finite number of equivalence classes in O
generated by ≺—my argument is consistent with the set of all possible outcomes corresponding
to infinitely many value levels. (We can, for instance, think of O as the set of outcomes
that actually could result from the decision-problems of interest.) Moreover, a simple re-
interpretation of the principles and assumptions that I introduce below make them consistent
with O being infinite. (I thank John Broome for making me see the need to emphasise this.)
6Transitivity states that if A is (weakly) preferred to B which is (weakly) preferred to C, then
A should be (weakly) preferred to C. Transitivity of indifference, which will play a role in my
argument, says that if one is indifferent between A and B and also between B and C, then one
should be indifferent between A and C.
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lifetime income or continuous social welfare, we can safely assume that for
any outcome Oi, there is an adjacent outcome Oi−1 that is only a tiny bit worse,
according to this decision-maker. Given how fine-grained probabilities are, it
would seem plausible that a decision-maker of this kind should then accept
that, for any p ∈ (0, 1), there is a (greater) q ∈ (0, 1) such that they would be
indifferent between lotteries like those in the above assumption.
However, given transitivity of indifference for lotteries (including trivial
ones, that is, outcomes), downward trade-off implies something that, although
not quite continuity, violates the anti-continuity judgement. (In the next section
I will add an assumption similar to downward trade-off which suffices to derive
continuity.)
Take the three best outcomes, On−2 ≺ On−1 ≺ On. Continuity for adjacent
elements entails that there is some q such that:
On−1 ∼ [On, q,On−2]
Downward trade-off then implies that there is some q′ such that:
[On, q,On−2] ∼ [On, q′,On−3]
Repeatedly applying downward trade-off, we eventually find that there are
some probabilities q′′ and q′′′, both in (0, 1), such that:
[On, q′′,O2] ∼ [On, q′′′,O1]
Applying transitivity of indifference then gives us:
On−1 ∼ [On, q′′′,O1]
In other words, there is some q′′′ ∈ (0, 1) such that the decision-maker would be
indifferent between the second best outcome and a lottery that with probability
q′′′ < 1 results in the best outcome and with probability 1 − q′′′ results in the
worst outcome.
More generally, from downward trade-off, continuity for adjacent elements
and transitivity of indifference we have derived:7
7Note that if we in addition assume Stochastic dominance, then we can drop the “adja-
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Implication. For any adjacent Oi and Oi+1, and for any j < i, there is some p ∈ (0, 1)
such that:
Oi ∼ [Oi+1, p,O j]
So, for any pair of adjacent outcomes, the decision-maker is willing to give
up the certainty of the less preferred one in the pair for a lottery between
the more preferred one in the pair and the worst outcome in O. In particular,
the decision-maker is willing to give up any fantastic social outcome for a
gamble between, on the one hand, the smallest possible improvement on the
fantastic outcome, and, on the other hand, the worst outcome—in violation of
the anti-continuity judgement.
In section 5, I shall weaken both continuity for adjacent elements and down-
ward trade-off by appealing to a threshold (intuitively, a threshold below which
an outcome becomes catastrophic) that blocks the above implication. But first,
in the next section, I shall examine how we can get the full continuity axiom
from continuity for adjacent elements and downward trade-off. For note that
while the above implication violates the anti-continuity judgement, it does fall
short of the fully general continuity axiom. But as we shall see, an assumption
very similar to downward trade-off suffices to derive continuity.
4 Deriving continuity
Consider the following assumption, which, although logically independent of
downward trade-off, seems at least as hard to deny as that assumption and for
similar reasons:
Assumption 2 (Upward trade-off). For any triple O j−1,O j,O j+1 ∈ O and for any
p ∈ (0, 1), there is a q ∈ (0, 1) such that
[O j, p,O j−1] ∼ [O j+1, q,O j−1]
To see that this added assumption suffices to derive continuity, take now
any adjacent O j−1,O j,O j+1 ∈ O. By continuity for adjacent elements, there is a
cent” qualification, but the implication will then be in terms of weak preference rather than
indifference. (Thanks to Christian Tarsney for pointing this out.)
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q ∈ (0, 1) such that:
O j ∼ [O j+1, q,O j−1]
By downward trade-off, there is a q′ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
[O j+1, q,O j−1] ∼ [O j+1, q′,O j−2]
By upward trade-off, there is a q′′ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
[O j+1, q′,O j−2] ∼ [O j+2, q′′,O j−2]
Repeating this type of reasoning we find that for any Oi,Ok ∈ O, where, for O j
from the first line in the argument, Oi ≺ O j ≺ Ok, there is a p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
[O j+1, q,O j−1] ∼ [Ok, p,Oi]
So, by transitivity of indifference:
O j ∼ [Ok, p,Oi]
In other words, we have established:
Observation. Continuity for adjacent elements, transitivity of indifference, down-
ward trade-off and upward trade-off together imply continuity.
5 Further weakening
Perhaps some even want to deny continuity for adjacent elements.8 So let’s
weaken it even further. To that end, let C be the (possibly fuzzy) set of catas-
trophic outcomes and assume there to be an η such that for any Ok ∈ O, if k ≥
η then Ok < C.
Axiom (Weakened continuity for adjacent elements). For any triple Oi−1,Oi,Oi+1 ∈
O such that Oi−1 < C, there is a p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Oi ∼ [Oi+1, p,Oi−1]
8In fact, Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005) deny continuity for adjacent elements, and end
their article on remarks about borderline cases that may support my next weakening.
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Those who hold the anti-continuity judgement due to perceived disconti-
nuity between catastrophic and non-catastrophic outcomes will presumably
find weakened continuity for adjacent elements to be an improvement over
continuity for adjacent elements. However, it is straightforward to see (from
the above argument) that weakened continuity for adjacent elements is incon-
sistent with the anti-continuity judgement in the presence of transitivity of
indifference and downward trade-off.
There is though a simple weakening of downward trade-off that will allow
us to accommodate the anti-continuity judgement while accepting weakened
continuity for adjacent elements and transitivity of indifference:
Assumption 3 (Weakened downward trade-off). For any triple Oi−1,Oi,Oi+1 ∈ O
such that Oi−1 < C, and for any p ∈ (0, 1), there is a q ∈ (0, 1) such that:
[Oi+1, p,Oi] ∼ [Oi+1, q,Oi−1]
The improvement of weakened downward trade-off over downward trade-
off, from the perspective of those who hold the anti-continuity intuition, is that
the weakened trade-off principle stops the sequences in the derivations in
the last two sections before reaching catastrophic outcomes, meaning that the
general and universally quantified continuity condition (“For any A,B,C ∈
O...”) cannot be derived.
But even those who hold the anti-continuity judgement might accept that
there is some sort of continuity condition that applies even to catastrophic
outcomes. To formulate a contender for such a condition, I will suppose that
there is some value γ ∈ [0, 1] such that:




Now, there may be problems with an ordinal definition of “sufficiently dis-
tant”, in particular, if the difference in value between different pairs of adjacent
elements is not constant. But however one defines “sufficiently distant”, even
those who hold the anti-continuity judgement might be tempted to accept:
Axiom (Distance continuity). For any Oi,O j,Ok ∈ O such that Oi ≺ O j ≺ Ok, and
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Oi ∈ C, O j < C, there is a p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
O j ∼ [Ok, p,Oi]
if and only if O j,Ok are sufficiently distant.
Even the “if” part of distance continuity generally seems plausible given
a high value of γ (i.e., close to 1).9 Suppose, for instance, that γ = (n −
2)/n. Then distance continuity only states that the decision-maker is indifferent
between the second worst outcome and some lottery between the best and the
worst outcome. (The higher γ is, the closer Oi is to O j.) For this instance of
distance continuity to to fail to hold, the difference in value between the second
worst outcome and the best outcome would have to be surprisingly small in
comparison to the difference in value between the second worst outcome and
the worst outcome.
Let us now consider a toy example that further illustrates how distance con-
tinuity works. The example will moreover serve as an illustration of why weak-
ened continuity for adjacent elements, weakened downward trade-off, upward
trade-off, transitivity, distance continuity, and the anti-continuity judgement
can be satisfied in a “non-trivial” way, that is, in an example where all of these
conditions sometimes apply.10
Let O = {O1, ...,O10}, C = {O1} and γ = 0.7. Then the conditions in dis-
tance continuity hold for the following triples: O1,O2,O10, and O1,O2,O9, and
O1,O3,O10. For instance, the axiom ensures that there is a p ∈ (0, 1) such that:
O3 ∼ [O10, p,O1]
Applied to this example, weakened continuity for adjacent elements ensures
that for any triple Oi−1,Oi,Oi+1 ∈ O \ {O1}, there is a q ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Oi ∼ [Oi+1, q,Oi−1]
The implication of upward trade-off and weakened downward trade-off is
then that, given transitivity of indifference, we can derive continuity for all
9For distance continuity to ever apply, we however must assume that: γ ≤ (n − 2)/n.
10I thank a referee for encouraging me to include an example like this in the paper.
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elements in O \ {O1}, that is, not only for adjacent ones. However, we cannot
derive this for the full set O; the weakening of downward trade-off prevents
the sequence from entering C = {O1}, as it were. Another way to put this,
is that the weakening of downward trade-off puts a floor on the sequence of
continuity-type judgements that we can derive from continuity for adjacent
elements. So, we cannot derive the fully general continuity condition, and
thus the anti-continuity judgement is satisfied.
There may nevertheless be reasons to think that those who hold the anti-
continuity judgement would not accept distance continuity.11 Perhaps the
judgment is based on the intuition that any lottery that confers a positive
probability on a catastrophe is worse than a sufficiently good status quo even if
that lottery provides a chance of an arbitrarily large improvement. I personally find
that too extreme. Nevertheless, it could be that although formally, distance
continuity is consistent with the anti-continuity judgement (even assuming
the aforementioned assumptions and axioms), the intuition underlying the
anti-continuity judgement conflicts with distance continuity.
6 Concluding remarks
To summarise, the following axioms and assumptions form a consistent set
and can together accommodate the anti-continuity judgement:
• Distance continuity
• Weakened continuity for adjacent elements
• Upward trade-off
• Weakened downward trade-off
• Transitivity of indifference
In contrast, we have seen that, for decision-makers whose aim is to max-
imise some continuous quantity under certainty, one cannot plausibly replace
the traditional continuity axiom with continuity for adjacent elements without
violating the anti-continuity judgement.
11I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for making me see this.
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